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 
Abstract—Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) are a 
particular subclass of mobile ad hoc networks that raise a number 
of security challenges, notably from the way users authenticate the 
network. Authentication technologies based on existing security 
policies and access control rules in such networks assume full trust 
on Roadside Unit (RSU) and authentication servers. The 
disclosure of authentication parameters enables user‘s traceability 
over the network. VANETs’ trusted entities (e.g. RSU) can utilize 
such information to track a user traveling behavior, violating user 
privacy and anonymity. In this paper, we proposed a novel, light-
weight, Adaptive Group-based Zero Knowledge Proof-
Authentication Protocol (AGZKP-AP) for VANETs. The 
proposed authentication protocol is capable of offering various 
levels of users’ privacy settings based on the type of services 
available on such networks. Our scheme is based on the Zero-
Knowledge-Proof (ZKP) crypto approach with the support of 
trade-off options. Users have the option to make critical decisions 
on the level of privacy and the amount of resources usage they 
prefer such as short system response time versus the number of 
private information disclosures. Furthermore, AGZKP-AP is 
incorporated with a distributed privilege control and revoking 
mechanism that render user’s private information to law 
enforcement in case of a traffic violation.                                
 
Index Terms— Authentication, privacy and trust, anonymity, 
revocation   
I. INTRODUCTION 
ANET’s are special cases of ad hoc networks in which the 
communicating entities are vehicles, and have variable or 
no infrastructure. VANETs (see Fig. 1) have emerged for 
providing comfort and flexible services, cooperative traffic 
monitoring, alternative routes estimations, real-time assisted 
navigation, roads closures due to severe weather conditions, 
collision detection, and avoidance, and access to the global 
network.  This exchange of traffic data among drivers helps 
enhance passengers’ traveling experience over these networks. 
Many VANETs applications that have been incorporated into 
the Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) [1], [2] [3], [4], 
[5], [6], [7] networks function on either a peer-to-peer (P2P) 
communication setup, or via a multi-hop communication 
setting. The attractive features of VANETs make such networks 
vulnerable to a wide class of cyber threats that already exist on 
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traditional computer networks [8]. For instance, attacks on the 
system integrity and availability include message fabrication 
and delaying, either intentionally or due to hardware 
malfunctioning. Serious consequences such as injuries and even 
death may occur due to such types of threats [9], [10], [11], [12], 
[13], [38]. To alleviate these problems, the development of a 
functional, reliable, and efficient security framework that 
integrates critical security features (e.g. authentication, 
nonrepudiation, and privacy-preserving) is required.  
Although, authentication between onboard units (OBUs) and 
roadside units (RSUs) plays a crucial role in supporting secure 
access to VANETs. Several shortcomings have been identified 
(i) authentication techniques that have been proposed in the past 
[14], [15], [16], [17] were mainly concerned with providing 
light-weight yet highly reliable authentication service to 
vehicles on the road, ignoring user’s privacy and tractability (ii) 
they were developed based on the deployment of security 
policies that place full trust on the RSUs or the authentication 
servers in the network. For example, in order to access different 
services available on VANET, legitimate users have to 
surrender their authentication parameters to these trusted 
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RSUs/Authentication entities. The authentication’s parameters 
may be used by the RSUs or authentication servers to track 
users’ traveling activities on the network. Therefore, concerns 
about users’ privacy may prevent some vehicle owners from 
joining these systems. 
Furthermore, user privacy in these systems is treated as one-
model-fits-all. Users operating on these networks are not 
capable of choosing their own privacy settings. However, 
privacy is a user-specific concept in the sense that different 
users may have varying privacy requirements. Moreover, a 
higher privacy requirement usually results in more 
computational or communication overhead. 
Our contributions. Given the conflicting goals of privacy 
and tractability, and the challenges in designing a light-weight, 
adaptive privacy-preserving authentication scheme for 
VANETs, we propose an Adaptive Group-based Zero 
Knowledge Proof-Authentication Protocol (AGZKP-AP). The 
protocol is based on the deployment of group-based Zero 
Knowledge Proof (ZKP) cryptographic system that supports 
anonymous authentication and distributed revocation between 
a trusted RSUs and an authorized 𝑂𝐵𝑈𝐺𝑖,𝑗  group member. 
Specifically, our main contributions in this paper include:  
1. Authentication protocol. The proposed protocol provides 
vehicles’ owners with the capability of anonymous 
authentication over the network. Trusted entities that are 
part of the VANET system will not be capable of tracking 
users’ activities based on the information they provided 
during the authentication process.  
2. Distributed privilege control & revoking mechanism. As 
authorized OBUs try to access the network, privilege 
revocation methods will be executed on RSUs to validate 
if these OBUs are allowed to access the network or not. 
Misbehaved OBUs that are detected and identified during 
the network’s access time will be broadcasted over the 
network via a distributed revocation method. 
3. Privacy-preserving threshold defensive scheme. The 
proposed scheme is based on ZKP crypto with the support 
of trade-off options. Users have the option to make critical 
decisions on the level of privacy and the size of resource 
usage they prefer such as short system response time versus 
the amount of private information disclosed. Moreover, the 
scheme enables users to customize their privacy level 
settings based on the different services they use on the 
network. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section II presents some 
of the existing authentication techniques in VANETs and their 
shortcomings. Section III introduces the background related to 
the ZKP protocol used during this research effort. Section IV 
describes an overview of the proposed system’s architecture 
with its supported capabilities. The proposed authentication 
protocol is presented in section V. Section VI describes the 
security analysis and the probabilistic model for the proposed 
protocol. Section VII addresses different threats models against 
AGZKP-AP, Section VIII studies the behaviors of AGZKP-AP 
against the ZKP simulator attack. Performance results and the 
conclusions are presented in sections IX, and X respectively.  
II. EXISTING AUTHENTICATION TECHNIQUES FOR VANETS 
A number of authentication protocols have been proposed in 
the past that support user’s anonymity over VANET [32], [33], 
[34], [35], [36], and [37]. Several protocols are based on 
cryptographic approaches like verifiable common secret 
encoding [17]. Using verifiable common secret encoding 
enables these protocols to provide adaptive anonymity. 
Verifiable common secret encoding is based on public key 
cryptography. Privacy-preserving authentication protocols that 
are based on the above cryptographic approach have some 
shortcomings when deployed on VANET infrastructures. 
Heavy cryptographic processing must be performed by each 
OBUs, leading to high access time. 
Raya and Hubaux [4] investigated the privacy issue by 
proposing a pseudonym based approach using anonymous 
public keys and the public key infrastructure (PKI), where the 
public key certificate is needed, giving rise to extra 
communication and storage overhead. The authors also 
proposed three credential revocation protocols tailored for 
VANETs, namely RTPD, RC2RL, and DRP [17], considering 
that the certificate revocation list (CRL) needs to be distributed 
across the entire network in a timely manner. All three protocols 
seem to work well under a conventional PKI. However, the 
authors also proposed to use frequently updated anonymous 
public keys to fulfill users’ requirement on identity and location 
privacy. If this privacy preserving technique is used in 
conjunction with RC2RL and DRP, the CRL produced by the 
trusted authority will become very large, rendering the 
revocation protocols highly inefficient. A lightweight 
symmetric-key-based security scheme for balancing 
auditability and privacy in VANETs is proposed in [4]. It bears 
the drawback that peer vehicles authenticate each other via a 
base station, which is unsuitable for inter-vehicle 
communications. Gamage et al. [18] adopted an identity-based 
(ID-based) ring signature scheme to achieve signer ambiguity 
and hence fulfill the privacy requirement in VANET 
applications. The disadvantage of the ring signature scheme in 
the context of VANET applications, is the unconditional 
privacy, resulting in the traceability requirement being 
unattainable. Group signature-based schemes are proposed in 
[19], [20], [21], where signer privacy is conditional on the 
group manager. As a result, all these schemes have the problem 
of identity escrow, as a group manager who possesses the group 
master key can arbitrarily reveal the identity of any group 
member. In addition, due to the limitation of group formation 
in VANETs (e.g., too few cars in the vicinity to establish the 
group), the group-based schemes [19], [20], [21], [22] may not 
be applied appropriately. The election of a group leader will 
sometimes encounter difficulties since a trusted entity cannot 
be found amongst peer vehicles. Kamat et al. [23], [24] 
proposed an ID-based security framework for VANETs to 
provide authentication, nonrepudiation, and pseudonymity. 
However, their framework is limited by the strong dependence 
on the infrastructure for short-lived pseudonym generation, 
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which renders the signaling overhead overwhelming. The 
proposed nonrepudiation scheme enables a single authority to 
retrieve the identity which may raise the concern of potential 
abuse. Schemes leveraging pseudonyms in VANETs can also 
be found in [25], [26] with the revocation feasible in limited 
settings, and in [27] where the certificate authority maintains a 
mapping from an identity to the set of vehicle-generated 
pseudonyms. There are also a number of defense techniques 
against misbehavior in VANET literature besides those in [4]. 
An indirect approach via the aid of infrastructure is used in [19] 
and [23]. The trusted authority (TA) distributes the CRL to the 
infrastructure points which then take over the TA’s 
responsibility to execute the revocation protocol. The 
advantage of this approach is that vehicles are not required to 
download the entire CRL. Unfortunately, the conditional 
anonymity claimed in [19] and [23] only applies among peer 
vehicles, under the assumption that the infrastructure points 
(group manager in [19] and the base station in [23]) are trusted. 
The infrastructure points can reveal the identity of any vehicle 
at any time even if the vehicle is honest. The scheme in [28] 
leverages a single TA to recover the identity of a (possibly 
honest) vehicle, where revocation issues are not discussed. 
Recently, Tsang et al. [29] proposed a blacklist-able 
anonymous credential system for blocking misbehavior without 
the trusted third party (TTP). The blacklisting technique can be 
applied to VANETs as: if the vehicle fails to prove that it is not 
on the blacklist of the current authenticator, the authenticator 
will ignore the messages or requests sent by this vehicle. 
Although not proposed specifically for VANETs, the proposal 
in [29] has a similar claim as ours that the capability of a TTP 
(network authority in this paper) to recover a user’s identity, in 
any case, is too strong of a punishment and highly undesirable 
in some scenarios. The downside of this technique is the lack of 
options to trace misbehaving users since any user in the system 
(misbehaving or not) will by no means be identified by any 
entity including the authorities. 
To the best of our knowledge, authentication protocols that 
are based on the ZKP approach have not been proposed in the 
past. The core implementation of our AGZKP-AP was built 
based on a symmetric cryptosystem and ZKP approach to 
minimize communication latency and computation time. As 
opposed to other authentication techniques that adapted the 
public key infrastructure model, high communication latency 
and heavy cryptographic processing were observed in such 
techniques.        
III. PRELIMINARIES 
The proposed authentication protocol in this paper is based on 
the ZKP cryptographic approach. User’s anonymity is 
preserved by incorporating ZKP [31] into the authentication 
protocol framework. Our authentication scheme is tailored with 
a distributed revocation method that determines the eligibility 
of authorized OBUs for accessing the network based on 
predefined security policies and dynamically updated 
privileges. The proposed system architecture is depicted in 
Fig.2.      
A. Zero Knowledge Proof (ZKP) 
ZKP is an interactive identification protocol which enables a 
prover P to prove his identity polynomially many times to a 
verifier V without allowing V to misrepresent himself as P to 
someone else. The proof of identity is either accepted or 
rejected in real time and as a result, the requested access is 
granted or ejected. The scheme provides light-weight 
identification and proves to be suitable for low-end systems 
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with limited processing power [31], like smart card 
technologies. With carefully preselected parameters, the ZKP 
scheme is about two orders of magnitude faster than RS-based 
identification schemes. 
The scheme assumes the existence of a trusted center who is 
involved in publishing a modulus m which is the product of two 
large prime numbers of the form 4𝑟 + 3. Such moduli are used 
in a variety of cryptographic applications, and their most useful 
property is that -1 is quadratic non-residue whose Jacobi 
symbol is +1 (mod m). After publishing m, the center can be 
closed. The ZKP identification scheme relay that a prover P 
proves to a verifier V that he knows whether a certain number 
is a quadratic residue or quadratic non-residue (mod m) without 
even revealing a single bit of information.      
IV. OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
In this section, we present an overview of the proposed 
architecture (see Fig. 2) that is tailored to support anonymous 
authentication over VANETs. The proposed VANET’s 
architecture consists of the following components: (i) roadside 
units enable vehicles on the road to access different services 
available on the VANET wirelessly. We consider that RSUs are 
uniformly distributed over the VANET to allow full coverage 
over the network (ii) vehicles are equipped with onboard units 
that enable the wireless exchange of traffic information and 
users’ data between vehicles on the roads and VANET services 
(iii)Vehicles Registration Sites  (VRS) along with onsite Key 
Distribution Centres (KDC)s are used to generate secret keying 
information, establish and assign OBU-group members, where 
secret keys are preloaded on OBUs prior to deployment (iv) 
Authentication Servers provide OBUs the capabilities of 
verifying the user credential while accessing different types of 
services available on VANET (v) Different types of services are 
available over the network, we consider a network of high-end 
servers that support different VANET services capabilities for 
users traveling on the road. In the proposed architecture, several 
trusted entities including the Key Distribution Centres, the 
Vehicles Registration Sites take the roles of establishing OBU 
groups, assigning secret authentication parameters to vehicles 
and RSU, as well as distributing partially precomputed security 
primitives over different network entities. As illustrated in Fig. 
2, a trusted roadside unit is denoted as RSUc and an authorized 
onboard unit is represented as 𝑂𝐵𝑈𝐺𝑖,𝑗  (a group member), 
where Gi represents the trusted OBU-group’s id and j represents 
the OBU’s id within the trusted group Gi. In the proposed 
protocol, we consider the zero-trust model in which users and 
RSUs do not trust each other. When designing the proposed 
protocol, we mainly focus on finding solutions to the following 
list of challenges:  
◊ Users’ privacy is a big challenge when operating on 
VANETs’ networks, since applying user’s private 
authentication parameters during the OBU-to-RSU 
authentication, the process might be observed by RSUs or 
authentication servers that could record and track users’ 
driving activities. User’s anonymity is achieved through 
the employment of the ZKP technique to verify/proof the 
group-based secrets of the OBUs/RSUs. In order to 
preserve user’ privacy without any server support, we use 
the group-based anonymous authentication. That is, an 
OBU only proves its membership within a group of OBUs 
using group-based secrets, avoiding exposure of its exact 
identity. 
◊ Achieving users’ profiling and tractability while keeping 
anonymity unimpaired is not a trivial task. Networks must 
support the revocation of misbehaving OBUs and limit 
their access to the network, and at the same time provide 
anonymity for others. Providing fast and reliable 
authentication services for authorized OBUs without 
compromising users’ privacy is critical. We propose a 
distributed revoking algorithm that is executed 
autonomously on each RSU deployed on the network. The 
revoking algorithm dynamically maintains and updates 
revoking tables with OBUs that need to be excluded from 
accessing the network.      
A. Supported Capabilities 
The following includes a list of capabilities that are supported 
by the proposed protocol. 
◊ Adaptive Anonymity: In the proposed protocol, users may 
be concerned with two types of privacy: location and 
identity privacy (OBU-to-RSU/OBU-to-OBU 
communications) and the privacy about the service usage 
patterns (OBU’s service requests). The protocol supports 
multiple anonymity levels, and users are allowed to choose 
their own privacy setting. Moreover, it enables users to 
dynamically perform trade-offs between the privacy level 
and resource utilization according to the users’ specific 
privacy requirements. 
◊ Zero-trust: Mobile users may want to use different trust 
policies depending on whether they are communicating 
with a public or private server (or application). These trust 
policies include 1) the full-trust in which the users trust 
both types of servers, 2) the partial-trust in which the users 
trust the private or public only, and 3) the zero-trust in 
which the users trust neither of these two types of servers. 
Previous research work [9], takes the partial-trust policy 
that trusts some public servers. With these approaches, the 
authentication requests are sent to some anonymity sever 
first. Then, the anonymity server sends the anonymized or 
aggregated requests to other service servers. Therefore, 
anonymity is achieved at the anonymity server level. In the 
partial-trust model, the trusted servers have the 
authentication information, e.g., identity of the mobile 
user, which can be used to easily track the activities of each 
individual mobile user based on the spatiotemporal 
analysis such as the MTT algorithm [12]. In this paper, we 
focus on the zero-trust model, i.e., the users will trust no 
RSU or server in the network. 
◊ Traceability is a required feature and it is supported by the 
proposed protocol where the identity information can be 
revealed by law enforcement authorities for liability issues, 
once accidents or crimes occur. 
◊ Light-weight: The proposed authentication model was 
designed to provide quick and reliable secure access to the 
network by incorporating light-weight cryptographic 
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techniques based on ZKP. Our model is designed to 
support networks with high speed moving nodes and strict 
communication range while preserving user privacy. 
Moreover, the authentication process has a strict real-time 
response.  
◊ Service Differentiation: Various services will be provided 
by both private service providers (e.g., automakers and 
other private companies offering services to the vehicles) 
and public service providers (e.g., government agencies). 
Those services need to be differentiated based on the 
priorities of services and the prices that customers have 
paid. However, there is a tradeoff between service 
customization and user anonymity. On one hand, a good 
resource allocation algorithm should provide customized 
services for each individual. On the other hand, 
differentiating services based on specific customer 
requirements will violate the anonymity requirement of the 
system. Our model enables users to pick and choose their 
privacy settings on each service provider that they 
subscribed for in the network. Based on the user privacy 
preference he will be able to control his level of exposure 
on the network. 
V. ADAPTIVE GROUP-BASED ZERO KNOWLEDGE PROOF-
AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL (AGZKP-AP) 
Our proposed protocol is composed of: 
◊ Key Management and OBU-groups Formation 
◊ Authentication Protocol 
◊ Distributed Privilege Control Revoking Mechanism 
A. Key Management and OBU-Group Formations 
The KDC will employ a Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) technique 
to digitally sign RSUs public keys. The protocol consists of the 
following steps: 
1. The KDC will generate a pool of certificates and will 
act as the certification authority for the RSUs. 
2. A signed certificate will be distributed to each RSU. 
3. RSUs transmit signed certificate as beacon signals to 
identify their presences over the network. 
The signed public keys can be advertised by both the RSU 
and the KDC to which the RSU belongs at the moment. 
Authentication process takes place between the RSUs and the 
OBUs, KDCs were employed only during the keys distribution 
 
Table 1: A list of notations used in AGZKP-AP 
 
and the OBU-group formation phase in which it is a one-time 
process. Digital public certificates were generated by KDCs and 
preloaded into RSUs at the time of deployment. Our protocol 
offers mutual authentication capability between an RSU and an 
OBU and without the involvement of any other VANET 
network components (e.g. authentication server, KDCs, etc.). 
Several Key Distribution Centres (KDCs) (see Fig.3) manage 
the establishment of the OBU-groups and the assignment of 
group-based secrets for each registered OBU. A KDC generates 
a set of q OBU-groups with groups ids {G1, G2, …,Gi, …, Gq}. 
For each OBU-group, Gi, where1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑞. The key generation 
protocol performs the following tasks: 
1. A set X of n secrets {𝑆1, 𝑆2,…, 𝑆𝑥,…, 𝑆𝑛} are randomly 
chosen from the finite field Zm.   
2. A subset of k secrets is randomly selected from set X and 
assigned to each group’s member of Gi, where k<<n.  
3. Compute Ix = ±𝑆𝑥
2(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑚),where 𝑥 ∈ {1, 2, … , 𝑛} 
4. Publish I1, I2, … In over the group’s members (OBUs), 
keeping 𝑆1, 𝑆2,…, 𝑆𝑛 private to RSUs. 
5. Assigns a unique master secret 𝑆𝐺𝑖  which is composed of 
k secrets 𝑃𝑟1, 𝑃𝑟2, … , 𝑃𝑟𝑦, … , 𝑃𝑟𝑘, randomly chosen from 
the Finite field Zm. The k secrets are preloaded into each 
OBU-group member.   
6. Computes gy = ±𝑃𝑟𝑦
2(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑚), where 𝑦 ∈ {1, 2, … , 𝑘} 
7. Publishes and distributes g1, g2,…,gk to RSUs, 
keeping{𝑃𝑟1, 𝑃𝑟2,…, 𝑃𝑟𝑦,…, 𝑃𝑟𝑘} private to OBUs. 
Symbols  Descriptions  
OBU Onboard Unit 
RSU Roadside Unit 
KDC Key Distribution Center  
q The total number of randomly generated OBU-groups  
Gi The OBU-group id, where 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑞 
X Represents the set of secrets in the Finite field Zm, where m is 
a prime number 
n Represents the total number of secrets that are randomly 
selected and assigned to each RSU  
Sx Represents the x-th secret in set X, where 1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑛 
k The total number of secrets that are randomly chosen from 
set X and assigned to an OBU 
Ix The whiteness for secret Sj where 1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑛   
𝑆𝐺𝑖  The Gi OBU-group master key that is composed of k 
randomly selected secrets 
Pry The y-th secret of an OBU-group master key  where 1 ≤ 𝑦 ≤
𝑘 
gy The whiteness for secret  Pry where 1 ≤ 𝑦 ≤ 𝑘   
𝑂𝐵𝑈𝐺𝑖,𝑗 An OBU member with id, j within group Gi  holds a copy of 
the master secret 𝑆𝐺𝑖 
µ. The total number of ZKP terms generated during each 
authentication occurring between an OBU and RSU 
α A privacy performance metric that limits the number of ZKP 
terms needed to be verified for successful authentication.  
Cert(Pubs) RSUs  public certificates  
Fig. 3. Key distribution and groups’ formation 
n randomly 
generated secrets  
k randomly 
chosen secrets  
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In the proposed authentication protocol, m is public and 
preloaded into the RSUs and OBUs during the vehicles’ 
registration process. Secrets keys {𝑆1, 𝑆2,…, 𝑆𝑥,…,  𝑆𝑛},  
 
and {𝑃𝑟1, 𝑃𝑟2,…, 𝑃𝑟𝑦 ,…, 𝑃𝑟𝑘} are kept private to RSUs and 
OBUs respectively. The Sx or Pry (which are witnesses to the 
quadratic residuosity character of the Ix or gy respectively) are 
effectively hidden by the difficulty of extracting square roots 
mod m, and thus prover P can establish his identity by proving 
that he knows these Sx or Pry. By allowing Ix and Pry to be either 
plus or minus a square modulo a Blum integer, the protocol 
make sure that Ix and Pry can range over all the numbers with 
Jacobi symbol +1mod m and thus Sx and Pry exist (from the 
verifier V point of view) regardless of Ix and Pry character as 
required in the ZKP. OBU-group members can be identified 
based on their assigned private secrets set which are kept private 
at the KDCs, No other entities of the VANET like RSU and 
authentication servers have access to such information. We 
assume that authentication servers, RSUs and KDCs are not 
cooperating during the OBU-to-RSU authentication process. 
Private secrets are preloaded into each vehicle’s OBU during 
registration. The proposed authentication model was inspired 
from the verifiable common secrets encoding algorithm. 
Common verifiable secrets integrated with a ZKP cryptography 
solution are used to solve the problem RSU-to-OBU 
anonymous authentication, preventing an OBU from releasing 
its private authentication information to RSU/Authentication 
servers during this process. 
B. Authentication Protocol 
In the proposed protocol, anonymity is achieved via the 
implementation of a two-way ZKP cryptographic protocol. We 
have adopted a two-way verification and proving crypto 
approach based on ZKP, where RSU acts as the verifier and 
OBU as the prover during the OBU-to-RSU authentication 
phase. RSUs’ and OBUs’ proofs were encrypted/decrypted 
using symmetric encryption technique, AES128. We employed 
a hybrid cryptosystem that uses the public key infrastructure to 
securely distribute session keys between the RSU and the OBU. 
The proposed protocol relied on AES crypto to facilitate the 
quick exchange of secure authentication parameters between 
RSUs and OBUs. Various privacy’s models are supported by 
the proposed protocol. We applied a user-centric approach 
when defining the amount of private information disclosure 
during the authentication process. In the proposed protocol, we 
consider the use of a privacy performance metric α that is 
incorporated into the design of AGZKP-AP. We use this 
performance metric to limit the number of ZKPs needed to be 
verified for successful authentication. During the authentication 
process, AGZKP-AP provides users with the capabilities of the 
dynamic allocation of resources in terms of communication 
overheads, latency, and the number of information leakages. α 
is provided to control the number of private authentication 
parameters that are exposed on the network. The protocol 
supports multiple anonymity levels {α=1, α=2, α=3, α=4, α=5}, 
and users are allowed to choose their own privacy setting. As α 
increases, the amount of the private information being disclosed 
over the network increases, highest level of users’ anonymity is 
achieved setting α=1. Moreover, AGZKP-AP enables users to 
dynamically perform trade-offs between privacy level and 
resources utilization according to the users’ specific privacy 
requirements. Based on user preferences and the type of service 
being requested, a privacy parameter α is proposed by the 
requester. Both the service provider and the requester must 
mutually agree on the privacy value before processing any 
authentication requests. For example, 𝑂𝐵𝑈𝐺𝑖,𝑗(Prover) submits 
proof of membership to an RSU (Verifier), that is a member of 
group Gi and it holds a copy of the master secret 𝑆𝐺𝑖 . That is, an 
OBU only proves its membership within a group of OBUs using 
a group-based secret, avoiding its identity exposure to the 
RSUs. During the RSU-to-OBU authentication phase, the 
Verifier (OBU) will engage in µ ZKP sessions with the Prover 
(RSU), where µ is a performance metric incorporated into the 
Cert (Pubs) 
Pubs (Gi, T1, Ksession, SRV-ID, α) 
OBU:P RSU:V 
ZKP: Ksession (T2, PF( 𝑆𝐺𝑖)) 
(Ksession (PF(𝑡1)), Ksession (PF (𝑡2)),…, Ksession (PF (𝑡𝑖)),…, Ksession (PF (𝑡𝜇))) 
OBU:V RSU:P 
OBU RSU 
OBU:PRSU:V 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
RSU:POBU:V 
  
Fig. 4. The proposed authentication protocol (AGZKP-AP) 
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protocol design, such metric can be used to trade off reliability 
for latency. It will define a threshold value for the maximum 
number of ZKP proofs that need to be verified. RSU submits µ 
proofs of knowledge indicating that it holds a copy of the OBU-
group-based secrets {𝑆1, 𝑆2,…, 𝑆𝑛}. An OBU controls the 
amount of private information being leaked during the 
authentication process by limiting the number of required ZKP 
verifications to α, where α≤µ. In order for an RSU to be 
authenticated by an OBU, the OBU must be able to successfully 
verify at least α RSU-proofs. To avoid the exposure of the 
user’s identity during authentication, verification of the OBU’s 
private secrets are performed at the OBU level and not at the 
RSU level. An OBU will be able to anonymously authenticate 
an RSU and without leaking extra information that could lead 
to user identity theft. A high-level system model with the 
AGZKP-AP algorithm is depicted in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5: 
1. RSUOBU: Cert (Pubs). RSU announces its presence 
periodically with its digital public certificate. 
OBURSU: Pubs (Gi, T1, Ksession, SERV-ID, α). OBU 
constructs a message with its group identifier Gi, current 
time T1, a session key Ksession, the requested service’s id 
SERV-ID, and a user-selected privacy parameter α. It 
then encrypts the message with the RSU’s public key 
Pubs. 
2. Requests submitted by authorized users will be verified 
with the services providers to determine if a given 
request with a privacy parameter α is allowed through 
the network or not. In order for a user to access a service 
on the network, both the requester and the service 
provider must establish a mutual agreement on the level 
of privacy used.   
3. OBU:PRSU:V. RSU and OBU initiate the ZKP 
protocol, OBU acts as a prover and sends a proof of 
knowledge PF( 𝑆𝐺𝑖) generated at time T2. The proof is 
encrypted using the session key Ksession (T2, PF( 𝑆𝐺𝑖)). 
RSU will verify the OBU’s proof to achieve OBU-to-
RSU authentication.  
4. RSU:POBU:V. OBU and RSU engage in µ ZKP 
sessions. RSU submits µ encrypted proofs of knowledge 
(Ksession (PF(𝑡1)), Ksession (PF (𝑡2)),…, Ksession (PF 
(𝑡𝑖)),…, Ksession (PF (𝑡𝜇))), where each PF (𝑡𝑖) is 
computed by randomly choosing k secrets from the 
OBU-group-based secrets (𝑆1, 𝑆2,…, 𝑆𝑛) in Gi. This 
dynamic generation of the µ proofs is determined by the 
service requester (𝑂𝐵𝑈𝐺𝑖,𝑗), such that no two proofs in 
the above setting consists of the same k secrets sequence.  
5. OBU decrypts these µ RSU’s proofs and confirms 
anonymity. Upon successful decryption and verification, 
it constructs a reply message with the value α. In the 
proposed protocol, the value of the privacy parameter α 
is used to determine the minimum numbers of RSU’s 
proofs that an OBU must be able to verify during the 
OBU-to-RSU authentication phase. We use α as a 
performance metric that allows users to trade-off 
between authentication reliability and speed. 
C. Protocol’s Security Model 
User’s anonymity is achieved in AGZKP-AP by employing the 
following ZKP-based technique: 
 
 
Fig. 5. AGZKP-AP algorithm 
 
C.1 Scenario: Two OBUs accessing VANET via RSUj 
 
To illustrate the visibility of the proposed protocol in terms of 
preserving the privacy of two OBUs trying to authenticate to 
the VANET via the same RSU. We consider the case of two 
OBUs, 𝑂𝐵𝑈𝐺1,𝑎and 𝑂𝐵𝑈𝐺2,𝑏 from groups G1 and G2 
respectively, accessing the network via RSUj. Group G1 is 
assigned the set of secrets X: {𝑆11, 𝑆12,…, 𝑆1𝑛}, Group G2 is 
assigned the set of secrets Y: {𝑆21, 𝑆22,…, 𝑆2𝑛}. As described 
early, RSUs are preloaded with the randomly generated sets of 
OBU-groups based secrets, including the sets of secrets for 
groups G1 and G2. Two sets of witnesses𝑊𝐺1: {𝐼11, 𝐼12,…, 𝐼1𝑛}, 
and 𝑊𝐺2: {𝐼21, 𝐼22,…, 𝐼2𝑛} are securely computed by the KDC 
and stored in the OBUs, 𝑂𝐵𝑈𝐺1,𝑎and 𝑂𝐵𝑈𝐺2,𝑏 respectively. In 
addition to the witnesses sets, unique group-based master keys 
 𝑆𝐺1and  𝑆𝐺2are preloaded into 𝑂𝐵𝑈𝐺1,𝑎and 𝑂𝐵𝑈𝐺2,𝑏  
respectively. Meanwhile, witnesses sets for the group-based 
 
1. A verifier (OBU)  randomly picks µ sets of 𝑘 −secrets-ids, 
and shares them with the prover, where 0 ≤ secret-id ≤ n 
 
2. The prover (RSU) uses these secrets-ids to establish µ 
ZKP proofs as follows:  
do loop µ times (OBU tries to verify α ZKP proofs out of µ) 
      do loop h times (execute for each ZKP proof) 
3. A prover (RSU) picks a random number R, and 
sends  
W = ±𝑅2(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑚). 
4. A verifier (OBU) sends a random binary string (b
0, 
…, bk) 
5. The prover computes the value  
                 Y = 𝑅. ∏ 𝑆𝑥
𝑏𝑥(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑚)𝑥=𝑘𝑥=0  and sends it to the verifier 
6. The verifier receives Y and verifies that 𝑌2 =
𝑊. ∏ 𝐼𝑥
𝑏𝑥(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑚)𝑥=𝑘𝑥=0   
Repeat  
Repeat  
7. The verifier returns the number of ZKP proofs 
successfully verified. To establish access to the 
network, this number must be at least equal to the 
privacy parameter α.    
 
do loop h times 
1. A prover (OBU) picks a random number R, and sends 
W = ±𝑅2(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑚) 
2. A verifier (RSU) sends a random binary string (b0, …, 
bk) 
3. The prover computes the value 
Y = 𝑅. ∏ 𝑃𝑟𝑦
𝑏𝑦(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑚)𝑦=𝑘𝑦=0  and sends it to the 
verifier 
4. The verifier receives Y and verifies that 𝑌2 =
𝑊. ∏ 𝑔𝑦
𝑏𝑦(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑚)𝑦=𝑘𝑦=0   
Repeat   
OBU:PRSU:V 
  
RSU:POBU:V 
  
* 
* Steps 1 and 2 are only executed once during the authentication process. 
* 
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keys,  𝑆𝐺1and  𝑆𝐺2 are stored in every RSU connected to the 
network including RSUj. The following list of interactions take 
place between the two OBUs and RSUj.: 
1. The discovery of RSUj by OBUs using the PKI approach  
 OBUG1,a , transmits a message encrypted with RSUj 
public key. The encrypted message comprised of a 
timestamp, a randomly generated session key K1, the 
group’s id, G1, the requested service’s id SERV-ID, 
and a user-selected privacy parameter α (e.g. α =2).  
 OBUG2,a , transmits a message encrypted with RSUj 
public key. The encrypted message comprised of a 
time stamp, a randomly generated session key K2, the 
group’s id, G2, the requested service’s id SERV-ID, 
and a user-selected privacy parameter α (e.g. α =2).  
 RSUj tags each received session keys, K1 and K2 with 
a unique id, IDK1 and IDK2 respectively. IDs are 
randomly generated for each authentication session. 
We used these dynamically generated IDs to identify 
OBUs’ session keys when applying encryption and 
decryption.  
2. OBUG1,a and OBUG2,bin this step act as proofers and RSUj  
acts as a verifier 
 𝑂𝐵𝑈𝐺1,𝑎constructs a proof of knowledge 
K1(Timestamp, PF( 𝑆𝐺1)) encrypted with key, K1 and 
sends it to RSUj.  
 𝑂𝐵𝑈𝐺2,𝑏constructs a proof of knowledge K2(Time 
stamp, PF( 𝑆𝐺2)) encrypted with key, K2 and sends it 
to RSUj.  
 RSUj make uses of the witnesses sets, 𝑊𝐺1, 𝑊𝐺2it 
possess to verify that both OBUs hold the right sets of 
secrets. 𝑂𝐵𝑈𝐺1,𝑎and 𝑂𝐵𝑈𝐺2,𝑏proofs are individually 
verified by RSUj. 
3. RSUj acts as a proofer, and OBUG1,a,OBUG2,bact as verifiers  
 RSUj constructs µ encrypted proofs of knowledge (K1 
(PF(𝑡1)), K1 (PF (𝑡2)),…, K1 (PF (𝑡𝜇))). RSUj sends 
the encrypted proofs to 𝑂𝐵𝑈𝐺1,𝑎. Proofs are computed 
by randomly choosing k secrets from the OBU-group-
based secrets (𝑆11, 𝑆12,…, 𝑆1𝑛) in G1. This dynamic 
generation of the µ proofs are determined by the 
service requester (𝑂𝐵𝑈𝐺1,𝑎) and exchanged securely 
with RSUj, such that no two proofs in the above setting 
consists of the same k secrets sequence.  
 RSUj constructs µ encrypted proofs of knowledge (K2 
(PF(𝑡1)), K2 (PF (𝑡2)),…, K2 (PF (𝑡𝜇))). RSUj sends 
the encrypted proofs to 𝑂𝐵𝑈𝐺2,𝑏. Proofs are computed 
by randomly choosing k secrets from the OBU-group-
based secrets (𝑆21, 𝑆22,…, 𝑆2𝑛) in G2. This dynamic 
generation of the µ proofs are determined by the 
service requester (𝑂𝐵𝑈𝐺2,𝑏) and exchanged securely 
with RSUj, such that no two proofs in the above setting 
consists of the same k secrets sequence.  
 𝑂𝐵𝑈𝐺1,𝑎and 𝑂𝐵𝑈𝐺2,𝑏decrypt the RSUj proofs. They 
achieved anonymous authentication by validating α-
proofs (α ≤ µ), the two OBUs use their witness data 
sets, 𝑊𝐺1and 𝑊𝐺2to verify the RSUj identity, without 
the release of private keying information. 
Identification of 𝑂𝐵𝑈𝐺1,𝑎and 𝑂𝐵𝑈𝐺2,𝑏take place on the 
group-level to preserve OBUs privacy.   
  
 
Fig. 6. Privilege control and revoking mechanism 
D. Distributed Privilege Control and Revoking Mechanism  
At the time of OBUs deployment, each OBU is preloaded with 
a unique 64-bit initialization vector (IVs) assigned by the 
vehicle manufacturer. OBUs surrender their initialization 
vectors values to the VRS during the key management and 
OBU-group formation step. To protect user’s privacy, no 
trusted entities on the network have access to IVs values except 
VRS and KDCs. We employed counter mode encryption to 
generate an unpredictable sequence of secrets id each time an 
OBU accessing the network. Prior to joining the network, each 
OBU initialized its counter value to zero. As an OBU tries to 
join the network, it increments the counter value by one after 
each successful authentication, this value is securely shared 
with RSUs over the network in the case of identifying and 
isolating a violator. In this protocol (see Fig. 6), users relinquish 
their privacy when they attempt an act that violates the network 
access rules and policies. OBUs identification credentials will 
be rendered and made available for trusted entities on the 
network. 
Tractability and user profiling is maintained by the network 
through the utilization of a distributed privilege control and 
revocation scheme. A violator of the VANET network policy 
will be identified and revoked from the network at the time of 
accessing the network. For example, in the case of a violator 
trying to access a particular service available on VANET, the 
proposed scheme populates the network with the violator IV 
value. All trusted entities including RSUs will obtain a copy of 
the IV and update their OBU revoking tables. OBU revoking 
tables are maintained by RSUs and are dynamically updated by 
VRS. When an 𝑂𝐵𝑈𝐺𝑖,𝑗 violator is identified by the network, an 
RSU will modify its assigned unique master secret 𝑆𝐺𝑖  to some 
garble values preventing it from future access via its Gi OBU-
group membership. Our distributed privilege control and 
revoking mechanism employ a cryptographic pseudo-random 
function generator [30] that uses (IV + counter) as a seed to 
generate unpredictable sequences for each authorized OBU. 
OBUs’ sequences are composed of (𝑘 × 𝜇) secrets’ ids 
(1) Publish the 
violator IV values 
Update the OBU 
revoking table with the 
new added IV value 
Cryptographic pseudo 
random function 
generator  
IV  + Counter Cryptographic pseudo 
random function generator  
+ 
(5)Sequence 
matching 
(2) Release the 
counter value 
(4) IV+ Counter 
IV 
(3) Randomly 
generated sequence 
of secrets id  
VRS 
OBU RSU 
(5) Revoked 
if there is a 
match 
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randomly chosen from a pool of n available ids. We use seed 
values to track and identify network violators. A pattern 
matching algorithm was used to reconstruct the OBU sequence 
on the fly in which it’s compared to the received OBU 
sequence. In the case of a match, the RSU will attempt to isolate 
the OBU from the network. 
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS FOR AGZKP-AP 
This section provides probabilistic models for the proposed 
protocol.   
A. Probabilistic Modeling of the OBU-to-RSU Authentication 
scheme. 
As previously discussed, during the OBU-to-RSU 
authentication process, an OBU (prover) and an RSU (verifier) 
execute the ZKP protocol once, where an OBU tries to prove 
his OBU-group membership to the RSU. We have estimated the 
probability of an OBU cheater where an OBU can easily cheat 
a verifier (RSU) with probability Pc: 
 
𝑃c = (
1
2𝑘ℎ
) 
                             
A cheater needs to guess a random binary vector (b0, b1, …, bk) 
with a probability of 2−𝑘 per iteration, preparing W = 
±𝑅2/ ∏ 𝑔𝑖
𝑏𝑖(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑚)𝑖=𝑘𝑖=0  in step 1, & providing Y =R in step 3.  
B. Probabilistic Modeling of the RSU-to-OBU Authentication 
Scheme 
The main difference between the RSU-to-OBU and OBU-to-
RSU authentication schemes is the required number of ZKP 
proofs that need to be established during the verification 
process. We defined a threshold value µ that determines the 
minimum number of ZKP proofs a verifier needs to generate 
based on a random subset of (𝑘 × 𝜇) secrets chosen by the 
verifier (OBU) from the pool of n available secrets. We assume 
that all µ proofs are uniquely established by the verifier such 
that no two proofs, PF (𝑡𝑖) and PF (𝑡𝑗) are equal. The estimated 
probability of an RSU cheater is:    
    
𝑃𝜇 = (
1
2𝑘ℎ ∙ (
𝑛
𝑘
)
)
𝜇
 
C. User’s Privacy and OBU Identification Information 
Leakage 
During the RSU-to-OBU authentication, RSUs and OBUs 
engage in a selection process, where an OBU randomly 
establishes µ sets of  k-secret-ids, and shares them with the 
prover. We have estimated the probability PL of having a 
generated set that leaks the OBU identification information as: 
           
𝑃𝐿 =
𝜇
(
𝑛
𝑘
)
 
 
The proposed protocol offers a tradeoff between user’s 
anonymity and the strength of verifying an RSU by OBU. 
D. Probabilities Estimation for False Authentication 
False authentication occurs in the proposed protocol when two 
OBUs from the same group establish similar µ ZKP poofs with 
an RSU. As illustrated in section C, similarities occur when two 
OBUs in the same group submit identical µ sets, each of  k-
secret-ids to the RSU. The latter leads to the establishment of 
similar µ ZKP proofs. We computed the following 
probabilities: 
 
 The probability q that two OBUs used the same 
sequence of µ ZKP proofs for authentication and RSU 
verification. 
 
𝑞 = (
1
2𝑘ℎ ∙ (
𝑛
𝑘
)
)
𝜇
 
 
 The probability q that x OBUs used the same sequence 
of µ ZKP proofs for authentication and RSU 
verification. 
 
𝑞𝑥 = (
1
2𝑥(𝑘−1) ∙ (
𝑛
𝑘
)
𝑥−1)
𝜇
 
E. Probability Estimation for Missed OBU Revocation    
An OBU violator is missed with a probability p by our 
protocol’s revocation scheme when there are two OBUs with 
the same OBUs’ sequences. As presented in section III, OBUs’ 
sequences are composed of (𝑘 × 𝜇) secret ids randomly chosen 
from a pool of n available ids. The probability to have two 
OBUs with the same sequence is computed as: 
 
𝑝 =
1
(
𝑛
𝑘
) × ((
𝑛
𝑘
) − 1) × ((
𝑛
𝑘
) − 2) × … … × ((
𝑛
𝑘
) − 𝜇)
 
VII. THREAT MODELING FOR AGZKP-AP 
In this section, we describe a threat model (Fig. 7) that 
enables a simulator to circumvent all security measures 
implemented in the proposed protocol. The attack is 
1- Establish µ groups, each 
with k secrets 
2-pick a group and select its 
associated ZKP simulator from 
the list of available simulators    
3- Execute the selected ZKP 
simulator h times   
4- Pick the next group and 
execute step 3   
5- Repeat step 4 until no new 
group is selected   
ZKP 
simulators  
Attacker 
Fig. 7. Threat models  
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orchestrated by (i) employing a passive observer that records 
steps 3, 4, and 6 of the communication during each stage of the 
RSU-to-OBU authentication scheme (ii) For each set of k 
randomly chosen secrets, spoofed Y and W values along with 
their corresponding binary strings are recorded and used to 
construct a single ZKP simulator. The ZKP simulators are used 
by the attacker to spoof an RSU. Each constructed ZKP 
simulator is capable of establishing a single ZKP proof. In the 
proposed protocol, µ ZKP proofs are constructed based on a 
random selection process of µ sets, each with k-secrets. Based 
on this random selection process, (
𝑛
𝑘
) ZKP proofs can be 
developed. Therefore for an attack to succeed with a probability 
close to 1, (
𝑛
𝑘
) ZKP simulators are required with a memory 
requirement of 22𝑘+6 × (
𝑛
𝑘
) bytes (assuming each Y is a 64-bits 
value). In this work, our simulator can be represented as a 
matrix of size (2𝑘 × 2𝑘), where k is the length of the binary 
string (see Fig. 8 and Fig. 9). 
Fig. 8. A single ZKP simulator 
Fig. 9. Implementation of the threat model  
VIII. COUNTERMEASURE AGAINST ZKP SIMULATOR 
ATTACKS 
In this section, we address one weakness in the proposed 
AGZKP-AP and introduce a defensive mechanism against ZKP 
simulator attacks. ZKP protocols are susceptible to replay 
attacks. A ZKP simulator (cheater) can be constructed by 
observing and recording all ZKP’s communications. Since ZKP 
proofs are generated based on choosing a random binary string 
of length k, and random number R, a ZKP simulator attack is 
inexpensive to launch. It requires only 22𝑘+6 × (
𝑛
𝑘
) in terms of 
memory cost. To close this security gap, we proposed a novel 
technique that modifies internally how ZKP proofs are 
computed. We introduce a new ZKP method, where proofs are 
computed based on evaluating a shared polynomial F(x) of 
degree k. To compute a ZKP proof that is composed of k secrets, 
(i) a shared polynomial of degree k is constructed between a 
proofer and a verifier, where k polynomial coefficients are 
securely computed over the finite field ZQ at both ends using a 
cryptographic hash function. The shared polynomial F(x) is 
represented as: 
𝐹(𝑥) = ∑ 𝑎𝑘
𝑘−1
𝑘=0
𝑥𝑘∙𝑏𝑘 
 
The modified version of the ZKP protocol implements the 
following list of interactions.   
 
1. A prover (RSU) picks a random number R, and sends W= 
±𝑅2(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑚). 
2. The verifier (OBU) and the proofer securely construct the 
shared polynomial F(x) independently using a secure 
cryptographic hash function. 
3. The verifier (OBU) sends a random binary string (b0, …, 
bk) 
4. The prover computes the following values: 
           𝑔(𝑥) = ∏ ∑ 𝑎𝑘
𝑘−1
𝑘=0
𝑆𝑖
2𝑘∙𝑏𝑘
𝑘
𝑖=1
 
          Y = (𝑅2. 𝑔(𝑥))𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑚 and sends it to the verifier 
5. The verifier receives Y and verifies that 𝑌. 𝑌′ = 𝑊, where 
𝑌′ = (1/ ∏ ∑ 𝑎𝑘
𝑘−1
𝑘=0 𝐼𝑖
𝑘∙𝑏𝑘𝑘
𝑖=1 ) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑚 
6. Steps 1 through 5 are repeated h times.  
 
IX. PERFORMANCE RESULTS OF AGZKP-AP  
We evaluate the resiliency of the proposed protocol against an 
RSU cheater. As illustrated in section VI, an RSU cheater needs 
to guess a random binary string with a probability 2−𝑘 per 
iteration, prepares W = ±𝑅2/ ∏ 𝑔𝑖
𝑏𝑖(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑚)𝑖=𝑘𝑖=0  in step 1, and 
computes Y =R in step 3. Figures 10a & 10b illustrate how 
AGZKP-AP behaves with different tradeoff options. In Fig. 
10a, we compute the probability 𝑃𝜇 with different h iterations 
per ZKP proof, where the value h ∈ {4,5,6,8}.  
In our protocol, h, and the required number of ZKP proofs to 
verify an RSU, µ are utilized to estimate the resiliency of 
 
1. A verifier (OBU)  randomly picks µ sets of 𝑘 −secrets-ids, 
and shares them with the prover, where 0 ≤ secret-id ≤ n 
 
2. The prover (Attacker) uses these secrets-ids to identify the 
correct µ ZKP simulators for execution.   
do loop µ times (For each spoofed ZKP proof, pick a 
simulator ) 
      do loop h times (execute a simulation for each spoofed 
ZKP proof) 
3. The attacker picks a value 𝑊𝑅𝑖  from the W-matrix, and 
sends it to the verifier  
4. A verifier (OBU) sends a random binary string S (s
0, …, 
s
k
) 
5. The attacker picks a value 𝑌𝑠,𝑅𝑖  from the Y-Matrix and 
sends it to the verifier 
6. The verifier receives 𝑌𝑠,𝑅𝑖  and verifies that (𝑌𝑠,𝑅𝑖)
2
=
𝑊𝑅𝑖 . ∏ 𝐼𝑖
𝑠𝑖(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑚)𝑖=𝑘𝑖=0   
Repeat  
Repeat  
7. The verifier returns the number of ZKP proofs 
successfully verified. To establish access to the 
network, this number must be at least equal to the 
privacy parameter α.    
Attacker: POBU:V 
  
* Steps 1 and 2 are only executed once during the authentication. 
𝑌1,𝑅1   𝑌1,𝑅2   𝑌1,𝑅3 …𝑌1,𝑅𝑖 ……… 𝑌1,𝑅𝑘−2  𝑌1,𝑅𝑘−1   𝑌1,𝑅𝑘  
𝑅1     𝑅2     𝑅3 ……𝑅𝑖 …………𝑅𝑘−2     𝑅𝑘−1     𝑅𝑘 
𝑌2,𝑅1    𝑌2, 𝑅2 𝑌2,𝑅3 …𝑌2,𝑅𝑖  ……… 𝑌2,𝑅𝑘−2 𝑌2, 𝑅𝑘−1  𝑌2,𝑅𝑘 
𝑌𝑗,𝑅1   𝑌𝑗, 𝑅2  𝑌𝑗,𝑅3 …𝑌𝑗,𝑅𝑖  ………  𝑌𝑗,𝑅𝑘−2  𝑌𝑗, 𝑅𝑘−1  𝑌𝑗,𝑅𝑘 
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AGZKP-AP. At the same time these performance metrics offer 
a tradeoff between user’s anonymity and computation costs. 
Employing a higher number of h iterations per ZKP improves 
the protocol resiliency against a cheater, but at the same time 
introduces high communication overhead between an OBU and 
an RSU. Time-sensitive VANET services, for example, 
Emergency Response System (ERS) requires low latency and 
high data reliability to save lives. AGZKP-AP offers such 
capability by dynamically modifying the internal structure of 
ZKP to accommodate different types of service demands. 
Fig. 10b, presents the resiliency of the proposed protocol 
with various µ ZKP proofs used for verification, as the value of 
µ increases from 5 ZKP proofs to 10 ZKP proofs, the 
probability of cheater decreases since it takes more effort for an 
attacker to correctly guess all the randomly picked binary 
strings for each of the µ ZKP poofs required during the 
verification process. The attacker needs to correctly solve each 
of the µ ZKP poofs required for verification. Also, a higher 
number of secrets, k being chosen per group member has a 
direct impact on the probability of having a successful cheater.    
In Fig 11, we further analyze the tolerance of AGZKP-AP 
against an RSU cheater, by estimating the probability of having 
a successful cheater with a fixed number of assigned k secrets 
per group member and a fixed number of h iterations per ZKP 
(k =5, h=4). Two critical performance metrics, µ and n are used 
to capture the behavior of the AGZKP-AP during an RSU 
cheater attack. As the number of assigned secrets, n increases, 
the probability𝑃𝜇 decreases exponentially. Fig. 11 shows the 
probability of having a successful RSU cheater with various 
values for µ. 
 User’s privacy is controlled by the amount of private 
information being used during the RSU-to-OBU authentication 
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scheme. Information leakage is estimated by evaluating the 
probability, PL of having at least one ZKP proofs that carry 
OBU identification information (k randomly selected secrets 
per group member). Fig. 12 shows the probability, PL with 
n=50, randomly chosen secrets per group. We computed PL 
with various numbers of ZKP proofs, where µ =5, 6, 8, and 10. 
A higher number of ZKP proofs contributes to better resiliency 
against an RSU cheater, but at the same time introduces extra 
latency and communication overhead, which might not be 
suitable for time sensitive VANET’s services. Therefore, we 
provide an authentication protocol that is customizable and 
capable of dynamically updating its internal state based on 
service preferences (reliability versus latency) and user’s 
privacy settings. 
 We further, analyze the probability, q of false authentication, 
where two different OBUs within the same OBU-group 
produce the same sets of µ ZKP proofs for RSU verification and 
authentication. As depicted in Fig. 13, the probability, q was 
estimated with (n = 15, µ =5) and various values for h = 4, 5, 6, 
and 7. As the number of iterations per ZKP proof increases, q 
decreases. Also, there is an exponential decrease in the 
probability of false authentication as the number of randomly 
selected secrets grows from 5 secrets per OBU to 15 secrets per 
OBU. 
X. SIMULATION RESULTS OF AGZKP-AP  
To analyze the performance of AGZKP-AP in terms of 
communication delays and packet loss, we build a VANET 
simulation environment based on OMNET++. The proposed 
AGZK-AP was implemented on each OBU and RSU node 
deployed over the simulated network. In our simulation, we 
considered a VANET that consist of 10 RSUs and up to 50 
Fig. 14: Average communication delays and average packet loss ratio under various anonymity levels (α=2, α =4, and α =5)    
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OBUs per RSU, performing anonymous authentication 
simultaneously to access the network. RSUs were distributed 
uniformly across VANET, with 900m apart from each other. 
We assumed, that each OBU node is capable of sending and 
receiving data if it is within a 500m communication range of an 
RSU. We tested the performance of AGZKP-AP under various 
anonymity levels parameters {α=2, α=4, α=5} and pertained 
simulation data related to packet loss ratio and average 
communication delays. In our analysis, we used 
authentication’s packet size as another performance metric. 
Since anonymity level is directly proportional to the size of the 
authentication packets, we consider different simulation 
scenarios: (i) authentication packet size = 50Bytes, α=2 (ii) 
authentication packet size = 100Bytes, α=4, and (iii) packet 
size=125Bytes, α=5. For each anonymity level, a set of 48 
simulation data points were collected to observe the AGZKP-
AP behavior in terms of average packet loss. Also, a set of 48 
simulation data points related to average communication delays 
were collected. Figure 14a shows the simulation results of 
average packet loss ratios versus the average number of OBUs 
per RSU. As authentication packet size increases with the 
respect to α from 50 Bytes to 125 Bytes, there are slight 
increases in the average packet loss ratios. Meanwhile, as the 
average number of OBU per RSU increases from 5 OBUs to 40 
OBUs, the figure shows a linear increase in the average packet 
loss ratios under various (α)s. 
Figure 14b, presents the average packet loss ratio versus the 
OBU’s average speed (m/sec), as we elevate the protocol’s 
anonymity level, α from 2 to 5, the average packet loss ratio 
increases. As OBUs’ average speed increases from 14 (m/sec) 
to 27 (m/sec), the average packet loss ratios remain within 
0.00626 and 0.0197 for various α values. However, When 
OBU’s average speed is between 25(m/sec) and 27(m/sec), the 
average packet loss ratio increases from 0.00765 to 0.0765 for 
packet size (50 Bytes, α =2).  Figure 14c shows the average 
communication delays versus the average number of OBUs per 
RSU. The average communication delays increase linearly as 
the number of OBUs per RSU increases. In the same time, as 
we increase the protocol’s anonymity level, average 
communication delays increase due to an increase in the amount 
of authentication data being exchanged between an OBU and 
an RSU. Finally, Figure 14d presents average communication 
delays versus OBU’s average speed (m/sec). As illustrated in 
figure 14d, the average communication delays remain 
approximately steady at 0.00163, 0.00265, and 0.00321 with 
α=2, α=4, α=5 respectively. 
XI. CONCLUSIONS  
Protecting user’s privacy and minimizing traceability are 
important issues that have been not considered in existing 
research when designing authentication protocols for VANET. 
Traditional authentication schemes were developed in the past 
to provide a secure and reliable method for validating user’s 
credentials over the network. Vehicle Identification Number 
(VIN) along with data location can be used to track a user over 
the network. Trusted entities on the VANET can utilize 
authentication parameters for profiling user behaviors over such 
networks without the user’s approval. We consider such an act 
as a violation of user privacy. The main issue is related to the 
disclosure of the user’s authentication parameters when 
accessing the network. Therefore, we proposed a novel 
authentication technique called Adaptive Group-based Zero 
Knowledge Proof-Authentication Protocol (AGZKP-AP) based 
on a hybrid approach, combining common verifiable scheme 
with ZKP protocol to minimize the disclosures of user 
authentication parameters while accessing the network. Our 
approach is adaptive when it comes to offering various user 
privacy settings. The proposed protocol is integrated with a 
security feature that enables a network to dynamically adjust 
the internal state of the protocol to fit a service requirement. The 
amount of private information enclosed during the 
authentication phase can be controlled by a dynamically 
updated parameter, α, which serves as a threshold value for 
validating a user on the network. Another performance metric 
that controls the resiliency of AGZKP against an RSU cheater 
and a ZKP simulator is the number of ZKP proofs required for 
user verification µ. We evaluate our protocol with various 
values for µ, n, h, and k and determine its resiliency against two 
types of threat models (RSU cheater and ZKP simulator). As 
illustrated in the previous section AGZKP-AP provides 
substantial resistance to attacks with a probability of false 
authentication approaching zero. 
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